Reporting vulnerabilities
Email [email protected]. Do not open a public GitHub issue. We aim to acknowledge within 48 hours and provide a fix within 14 days for critical issues.Privacy guarantee
Snare never reads request bodies on canary callbacks. When a canary fires, the Worker returns a response before consuming the request body. This matters because canary callbacks may carry real credentials or sensitive data (e.g., an SDK trying to authenticate). The worker extracts only header-derived metadata:- Token ID, timestamp, IP, user agent, method, path, country, ASN
Device security
Your device secret lives at~/.snare/config.json with 0600 permissions. The ~/.snare/ directory is 0700.
If your device secret is compromised: run snare rotate immediately. This generates a new 256-bit secret, updates snare.sh, and re-registers all active tokens. The old secret becomes invalid.
What snare.sh sees
In managed mode (default), snare.sh receives:- Canary callback metadata: IP, user agent, timestamp, ASN, country
- Token registrations: token ID, device ID, webhook URL, canary type
- API authentication: device secret hashes (never the secret itself)
Known limitations
Manifest is readable locally.~/.snare/manifest.json contains token IDs and file paths. An attacker with local filesystem access could read it and identify canary files. Protect ~/.snare/ with file integrity monitoring.
Domain fingerprinting. snare.sh becomes a known canary domain once the project is public. Sophisticated attackers could avoid triggering canaries by detecting the domain. Mitigation: self-host with a custom domain.
Medium reliability canaries are conditional. Canaries that rely on env var loading (openai, anthropic) only fire if the agent reads the dotenv file AND uses the base URL override in the same process.