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The gcp canary plants a fake GCP service account JSON with token_uri pointed at Snare. When any GCP SDK attempts to authenticate with this service account, it calls token_uri to exchange the signed JWT for an access token — which fires the callback.

What gets planted

~/.config/gcloud/sa-prod-backup.json
The service account file uses a real RSA-2048 private key (a disposable canary key — not protecting any real data). This allows GCP client libraries to parse and use the key, reaching token_uri for the token exchange.

Trigger conditions

  • Any GCP SDK (google-cloud-python, google-auth, Go GCP libraries) loading this service account file
  • The token exchange happens before any GCP API call

Confirmed working

Tested with google-auth Python library — service_account.Credentials.from_service_account_file() → credentials.refresh() → POST to token_uri → alert fires. Alert user agent: python-requests/2.31.0 (google-auth uses requests under the hood).